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of the office. On the other hand, the dissent contends, that the
drawee bank is liable to the depositor for charging his account
with the amount of the checks paid to the unauthorized agent in
disregard of its contractual duty to pay them only to the payee or
the payee's authorized agent, and consequently, the payee as assignee of this cause of action is entitled to recover thereon.
It is of importance to note that in the situation where a collecting bank cashes checks drawn on other banks, as distinguished
from the situation where the drawee bank cashes the checks (as in
the Strickland case) and the indorsement is unauthorized or
forged, a different result is reached. The collecting bank is said
to hold the proceeds for the rightful owner and is liable to the
payee, even though paying the proceeds to the forger without
knowledge or suspicion of the forgery."
Edward Campbell.

CORPORATIONS
E

UITABLE JURISDICTION TO DISSOLVE A CORPORATION

D OES equity have the inherent power to dissolve a corporation
without the benefit of an authorizing statute upon suit by
stockholders? Many cases throughout the country have taken the
position that a court of equity has no such jurisdiction. The reason
given is that the existence of a corporation depends upon statute,
and its demise must be based on the same authority. Other cases
have held that equity has such power where the stockholder has
exhausted all other remedies.'
40 Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Fort Wotth State Bank, 65 S. W. (2d) 276
(Tex. Com. App. 1933); Greenville Nat. Exchange Bank v. Nussbaum, 154 S. W. (2d)
672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) writ of error refused; Graham Nat. Bank v. Frogge, 150 S. W.
(2d) 429 (Tex. Civ. App. ]941) ; Independence Indemnity Co. v. Republic Nat. Bank
& Trust Co., 114 S. W. (2d) 1223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) writ of error dism'd; U. S.

Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. First State Bank of El Paso, 93 S. W. (2d) 562 (Tex. Civ.

App. 1936) writ of error dism'd.

'Note, 43 A. L. R. 238, 288 (1926).
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Article 13872 provides five methods for ipso facto dissolution
in certain specific instances, and two methods are listed for
judicial ascertainment. One method authorizes judicial dissolution
upon a finding that the corporation is insolvent. Article 1383'
amplifies this by saying that stockholders who own 25 per cent
of the stock in an insolvent corporation may institute suit for
the dissolution. Under this article imminent danger of insolvency
is not enough. 4 Thus a minority stockholder must stand by, watching the corporation approach insolvency due to mismanagement,
fraud and the like, doing nothing until actual insolvency is
reached, unless equity has jurisdiction, either inherent or by
statute, to dissolve the business.
The second judicial method listed in Article 1387 is "by a
judgment of dissolution rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction." The statute does not define "a court of competent jurisdiction." Can this be used as a statutory basis for equitable dissolution of a corporation upon suit by a minority stockholder? The
cases do not answer this question.
Early Texas cases took the unequivocal position that a court
of equity had no power to dissolve a corporation at the suit of a
stockholder alleging fraud, ultra vires acts, and mismanagement
by the officers and directors.5 The court in People's Investment Co.
v. Crawford' held that equity had no authority to wind up the
affairs of a corporation at the suit of a stockholder, except, possibly "where the object of the corporation had become manifestly
impossible of attainment." The case did not define the exception.
It also stated that there was no statutory authority for such dissolution, and as a consequence the court refused to appoint a
receiver ancillary to the suit to wind up the affairs. The refusal
TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1387.
3 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1383.
4Petroleum Engineering Service v. Peairs, 73 S. W. (2d) 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
3 HILDE.BRAND ON TEXAS CORPORATIONS 353 § 842 (1942).
5
Burnet v. Smith, 240 S. W. 1007 (1922); Land Co. v. Bindle, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 18
(1893).
645 S. W. 738 (Tex. Civ. App., 1898).
2
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to appoint a receiver is but declaratory of the general rule in
Texas that a request for a receiver will not stand upon its own
feet, but must be accompanied by a cause of action before a receiver will be appointed.7 Since a request for dissolution was not
a cause of action, then the request for a receiver had to be denied,
even in the case of fraud and mismanagement This case, however, is not authority that equity has no statutory basis for dissolution at the present time, since Article 1387 was passed subsequent to the decision.
Later decisions have relaxed the rule that equity has no inherent
powers to dissolve a corporation. In Yount v. Fagin9 the court
limited the no jurisdiction rule to a "going corporation" and held
that equity did have jurisdiction to dissolve a corporation that
had-ceased to do business for several years. In Bershire Petroleum
Corp. v. Moore"0 the court went even further in granting a receiver
with authority to dissolve, if necessary, where the mismanagement
of the corporation was such to render it in danger of becoming
insolvent and where the action was necessary to preserve the interest of the stockholders.
In the 1948 case of Hammond v. Hammond" the Court of
Civil Appeals approved the more liberal view, when confronted
with the problem whether to dissolve a going corporation due to
bitterness between stockholders in a small, privately owned corporation. At the time of the suit the concern was already under
a receivership, but under that management the business had prospered and the time was soon approaching when the receiver would
have to be removed, due to the improved financial condition of
the company.
The court refused to dissolve the corporation, but the reason
7 Burnet v. Smith. 240 S. W. 1007 (1922) ; Land Co. v. Bindle, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 18
(1893).
a People's Investment Co. v. Crawford, 45 S. W. 738 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898).
9 244 S. W. 1036 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
10 268 S. W. 484, (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
11 216 S. W. (2d) 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) writ of error refused, n. r. e.
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was not lack of power, but because the party seeking dissolution
had not shown a need for it. The plaintiff stood in an excellent
position to be in control of the business, since control depended
upon who controlled the shares owned by a minor daughter of
plaintiff and defendant, the parties at one time being husband and
wife. There was no showing who would have this control. Also,
there was no allegation of mismanagement, fraud or ultra vires
acts. But the court said:
"A court of equity may properly take jurisdiction to wind up the
affairs of a corporation and sell and distribute its assets at the suit of
a minority stockholder on the ground of dissensions among the stockholders, but that it is only an extremely aggravated condition of affairs
that will warrant such a drastic action, and that the court will follow
such a procedure only when it reasonably appears that the dissentions
are of such nature as to imperil the business of the corporation to a
serious extent and that there is no reasonable likelihood of protecting
the rights of the minority stockholders by some method short of winding up the affairs of the corporation." '
This case based its opinion upon the inherent power of equity
to dissolve a corporation. No mention was made of Article 1387.
No attempt was made to find statutory authority, although it is
believed that the courts could so construe the statute. Surely the

clause that a corporation can be dissolved "by a judgment of dissolution rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction" means
something. It seems that the courts could define "a court of competent jurisdiction" to include equitable power. Of course, such
construction was not needed; the result reached is identical, regardless of the basis. Under the liberal view that equity has an
inherent power to dissolve a corporation, the courts do not make
it easy for a corporation to be dissolved. As indicated in the
Hammond case the need must be serious, and there must be no
reasonable likelihood of protecting the rights of the minority
stockholders by some other method.
r2id. at 633.
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PROMOTER'S CONTRACTS

A Texas corporation comes into existence free of all claims,
including any contracts made for them by promoters.' 3 However,
contracts of promoters made on behalf of the corporation, within
the scope of its general authority, may be adopted by the latter
after its organization."' The adoption can be by implication, as
distinguished from express, by the corporation's acceptance of the
benefit of the contract, with knowledge of the facts surrounding
the agreement. 5
a corporation had imIt was under the latter theory -that
pliedly accepted the benefit of a contract for the sale of goods
made by a promoter - that plaintiff sued in Wenzel v. BrooksAsbeck Inc.'6 In this case three men planned to start a clothing
business that was to be incorporated. Each was to put up equal
value. Brooks' share was to be contributed in merchandise. The
other men were told that the clothing had been paid for by Brooks,
and this was verified by the company that had sold the clothes.
Brooks had borrowed the money from the plaintiff to pay for the
clothing and had not paid the debt. The business operated as a
partnership for a short time, and then as a corporation. Plaintiff
sued the corporation for the money loaned to Brooks on the theory
that corporation had received the benefit.
The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court in ruling that the corporation was not liable. There was no
evidence of adoption of the contract and there was no evidence
that the corporation had knowledge of the facts surrounding the
contract of debt. It is true that they had received the benefit, in
the sense that they used the merchandise, but the contract was
made with Brooks without the knowledge of the corporation, and,
in the absence of adoption or implied consent, the corporation was
13Weatherford M. W. and N. W. Ry. v. Granger, 86 Tex. 350,24 S. W. 795 (1894).
141bid.
l51bid.
16211 S. W. (2d) 611 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) writ of errorrefused, n. r. e.
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not liable. This undoubtedly follows the well-established rule in
Texas.
In Moore v. Dallas Post Card Co." the court was presented
with a problem concerning a pre-incorporation contract, but there
the question was whether a corporation can sue for fraud on a
contract made by promoters, the corporation never having formally
adopted it. The promoters had contracted to buy a going business
from the defendant. The corporation was not mentioned in the
*contract, but the trial court found that the defendant knew that
the promoters were buying his business with the intention of incorporating. The trial court ruled for the plaintiff and the Court
of Civil Appeals upheld the decision saying that the corporation
was a proper party to sue, thus expressing the general rule in this
state.
A party for whose benefit a contract is made may sue on that
contract, and this includes a corporation's suits on pre-incorporation
contracts."8 Formal acceptance is not required,19 and the act of
suing is itself an adoption of the contract. 20 It is not necessary that
the third party be named in the contract, but it is sufficient that
the party be in some measure designated as the one intended :21
Thus, in this case, the finding of fact that the defendant knew of
the proposed incorporation was sufficient designation to warrant
suit by the corporation.
EVIDENCE OF STOCK OWNERSHIP

A certificate of stock issued by a corporation is not the stock or
interest owned by a party but is only evidence of that interest.22
17215 S.W. (2d) 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) writ of errorrefused, n. r. e.

'5 Coleman Hotel Co. v. Crawford, 3 S. W. (2d) 1109 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); 10
TEx. Jun. 607, § 16 (1930).
19
Waggoner v. Herring-Showers Lumber Co., 288 S. W. 260 (Tex. Civ. App., 1926)
Reversed, 40 S. W. (2d) 1, (1931) on other grounds.
2Obid. 10 TE.X. Jui. 607, § 16 (1930).
21McCown v. Schrimpf, 21 Tex. 29 (1858) ; 10 TEx. Ju. 483, § 280 (1930).
22 Turner v. Cattleman's Trust Co. of Ft. Worth, 215 S. W. 831 (Tex. Corn. App.
1919 adopted; Yeaman v. Galveston City Co. 106 Tex. 389, 167 S. W. 710 (1914).
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Non-production of the original certificate is not fatal to title, 3
nor is it necessary for a transfer.24 Texas cases do not answer the
question as to what is the minimum evidence required for stock
ownership.
In Greenspun v. Greenspun25 the suit was brought to establish
ownership in 500 shares of stock. Plaintiff alleged that defendant
was the sole owner of a corporation, that plaintiff had been given
500 shares of stock for services rendered and to be rendered in the
operation of the business, he being the bookkeeper and general
manager. No certificates were issued. The only evidence of ownership were the minutes of a stockholder's meeting in which it was
listed that laintiff owned 500 shares. About 20 years later defendant dissolved the corporation and with the assets formed a
new corporation without plaintiff's knowledge. Plaintiff sued to
recover his proportionate interest in the new corporation and to
recover his share of dividends declared by the new corporation,
contending that under Article 13882" that defendant is a trustee to
creditors and stockholders when a corporation is dissolved.
This case was in the courts for several years, the Court of Civil
Appeals in 19467 agreed with the trial court in holding that there
was sufficient evidence of ownership of the stock to warrant recovery for the plaintiff, but reversed and remanded upon other
grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision as to stock
ownership. 8 After the new trial the case came back to the Court
of Civil Appeals in 1948, which court affirmed a judgment of the
trial court in ruling for the plaintiff, in spite of the earnest con2

3:Baker v. Wasson, 53 Tex. 150 (1880).
Turner v. Cattleman's Trust Co. of Ft. Worth, 215 S. W. 831 (Tex. Com. App.
1919) adopted.
-f211 S. W. (2d) 977 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) writ of error refused n. r. e.
2STex. REV. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 1388. "Upon the dissolution of a corporation, unless a receiver is appointed by some court of competent jurisdiction, the
president and directors or managers of the affairs of the corporation at the time of its
dissolution shall be the trustees of the creditors and stockholders of such corpora24

tion ... "

27194 S. W. (2d) 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
198 S. W . (2d) 82 (1946).

28 .........-. Tex ..............

